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STUDENT NOTES AND RECENT CASES
NationaZ Bank v. Ariss, 68 Wash. 448, 123 Pac. 593. Daynes v.
Lindsly, 128 La. 259, 54 So. 791. Another view is that the section
imposes prima facie liability and that extrinsic evidence is admis-
sible to show a contrary understanding. Megowan v. Peterson,
173 N. Y. 1, 65 N. E. 738. G. C. Riordan & Company v. Thorns-
bury, 178 Ky. 324, 198 S. W. 920. These contrary holdings are
not surprising, since the language is not very explicit. "In fact, it
may be argued that the statute left untouched the question of
whether extrinsic evidence of mutual understanding and intention
might not change the liability." 27 Yale L. J. 686. Under such
circumstances the courts which had admitted such evidence before
the statute have admitted it under the statute by various interpre-
tations of the language.
If the agent cannot be held on the note, can an action be main-
tained against the principal, even though his name does not appear
on the note? It is clear that the principal cannot be held directly
on the note, as this would be flying squarely into the teeth of §18
of the Negotiable Instruments Law. Logan v. Parson, 79 Oreg.
381, 155 Pac. 365. In the principal case, however, the action of
assumpsit was not on the note directly, but on the debt as evi-
denced by the note. There is much authority supporting this dis-
tinction. Wood v. Key, 256 *. W. 314 (Tex. Civ. App.) In re
Metropolitan Bank & T. Company, 1 Oh. App. 409.
It is well to note that the syllabus in the Southeastern advance
sheets states that an action of assumpsit on the note may be main-
tained against the principal while the headnote of the West Vir-
ginia court states that the holder may maintain assumpsit on the
debt as evidenced by the note.
BYRON B. RANDOL.P'.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
-ADmIsSIBIlITY OF EVIDENcE.-Defendants were in the business
of selling and transporting liquor. Federal prohibition officers
tapped wires from their residences and from the chief office. The
taps from the house lines were made in the streets near the house.
The taps from the chief office were made in the basement of an
office building. By so intercepting conversations of the defendants
they obtained the evidence which convicted defendants of con-
spiracy. Wire-tapping is illegal in the state (Washington) where
the act occurred. The Supreme Court of the United States in a
five-four decision held that the evidence so intercepted did not
constitute "unlawful search or seizure" and was admissible.
Olmstead et al. v. United States, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564.
Justice Taft in delivering the opinion of the court held that
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wire-tapping did not violate the constitutional safeguard contained
in the Fourth Amendment: "The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated." The chief justice recognizes
the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to mailed letters, but
draws a distinction between them and telephone messages. He
notes the case of Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U. S. 723, 733, 24 L. Ed.
877, in making that distinction. That case held: "The constitu-
tional guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their
papers against unreasonable searches and seizures extends to their
papers thus closed against inspection wherever they might be. No
law of Congress can place in the hands of officials connected with
the postal service any authority to invade the secrecy of letters and
such sealed packages in the mail; and all regulations adopted as
to mail matter of this kind must be in subordination to the great
principle embodied in the Fourth Amendment of the Constitu-
tion." It would seem then that a message written on paper is
protected from the intrusion of governmental authority, while the
same message if transmitted by wire is not. Is this distinction
predicated on a difference? When the Fourth Amendment was
adopted the telephone was unknown and unprophesied. Justice
Brandies, in his dissenting opinion in the case under discussion
said: "Clauses guaranteeing to the individual protection against
specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adapta-
tion to a changing world." And in Weems v. United States, 217
U. S. 349, 373, 30 Sup. Ct. 544, 551, 54 L. Ed. 793, the court
said: "Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted,
it is true, from an experience of evils, but its general language
should not, therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil
had heretofore taken . . . the future is their care, and provisions
for events of good and bad tendencies of which no prophecy can
be made." Should not then the impossibility of the specific inclu-
sion of the telephone message in the Fourth Amendment excuse its
exclusion, if all the reasons for protection of the sealed letter apply
to it? Judge Rudkin in comparing the telephone message and the
sealed letter below, said: "True, the one is visible, the one invisi-
ble; the one is tangible, the other intangible; the one is sealed,
and the other unsealed; but these are distinctions without a
difference." In a letter, it is not the paper itself, nor the sealing
that makes inviolate its privacy. It is the substance, the thought
of the author, the message itself, that is given protection. Is that
same substance, thought, and message to be excluded from protec-
tion merely because it is oral, and because its privacy is delved
by the ear, and not by the eye? Justice Bradley, in the case of
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 29 L. Ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ot.
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524 said, in reference to the rights protected by the Fourth
Amendment: "They apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and
the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his door nor the
rummaging of his drawers that constitute the essence of the
offense, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty, and private property." Justice Taft
further said that the Fourth Amendment may have proper appli-
cation to a sealed letter in the mail because of the constitutional
provision for the Post Office and the relation between the govern-
ment and those who pay to secure protection. Why the govern-
ment should be bound by the Fourth Amendment when it is itself
the agent of transmission aid not be bound when, the agent of
transmission is a public service authorized by it, as in the ease of
the telephone, is not shown.
The Supreme Court in holding that this was not an "unreason-
able search and seizure" placed a literal construction on the
Fourth Amendment, and limited that amendment's application to
evils existing at the time of its adoption. But since the evidence
was held not to be obtained in violation of the Constitution, the
court in holding it admissible is following, the established fed-
eral rule. 34 VA. L. QUART. 149-150; Weeks v. United States, 232
U. S. 383, 58 L. Ed. 652; Gould v. United States, 255 U. S. 298,
65 L. Ed. 647, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261
Justice Holmes expresses na opinion as to whether or not the
evidence was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. He
bases his dissent ofA the ground that the procurement of the
evidence by the violation of the state statute (one making wire-
tapping illegal) is sufficient to exclude it regardless of the Fourtb
Amendment. Such a view is an extension of the federal rule
mentioned, supra. "I think it is a less evil that some criminals
should escape than that the government should play an ignoble
part", argued the learned justice.
If the underlying question were only the protection of society
from criminals the solution would be simple. But the question
encompasses the right of the whole people, innocent as well as
guilty, from encroachment upon their personal liberty privacy
and security by government officers. It would seem that the real
problem underlying the holding and the dissent is the difference
of view as to which of the two ends is more desirable: the pro-
tection of privacy at the cost of the loss of the conviction of
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